With the rapid increase in computing, storage and networking resources, data is not only collected and stored, but also analyzed. This creates a serious privacy problem which often inhibits the use of this data. In this paper, we focus on the problem of linear programming, which is the most important sub-class of optimization problems. We consider the case where the objective function and the constraints are partitioned between two parties with one party holding the objective while the other holds the constraints. We propose a very efficient and secure transformation based solution that has the significant added benefit of being independent of the specific linear programming algorithm used.
the function). However, this can lead to very inefficient solutions for complex functions or for large input sizes. More efficient solutions are necessary for important sub-problems.
In this paper, we look at the specific problem of how organizations optimize allocation of global resources while preserving the privacy of local information. Optimization is a fundamental problem found in many diverse fields. Research in optimization methods has generated many successes; the ubiquitous collection of data opens even greater opportunities. Much of this data is constrained by privacy and security concerns, preventing the sharing and centralization of data needed to apply optimization techniques.
Linear programming deals with a sub-class of these where all of the constraints and the objective function are linear. Linear Programming models are applicable to a wide variety of problems. Well known examples arise in many industries including transportation, commodities, airlines, communication, etc. There are also a variety of military applications and other economic applications.
A specific example can be seen in the packaged goods industry, where delivery trucks are empty 25% of the time. Just two years ago, Land O'Lakes truckers spent much of their time shuttling empty trucks down slow-moving highways, wasting several million dollars annually. By using a web based collaborative logistics service (Nistevo.com), to merge loads from different companies (even competitors) bound to the same destination, huge savings were realized (freight costs were cut by 15%, for an annual savings of $2 million [19] ). Though this required sending all information to a central site, there was no alternative if savings were desired. However, the proposed solution could make this possible without the release of proprietary information. Another example is that of Walmart, Target and CostCo, who individually, ship millions of dollars worth of goods over the seas every month. These feed in to their local ground transportation network. The cost of sending half-empty ships is prohibitive, but the individual corporations have serious problems with disclosing freight information. If it were possible simply to determine what trucks should make their way to which ports to be loaded onto certain ships i.e., solve the classic transportation problem, without knowing the individual constraints, the savings would be enormous. In all of these cases, complete sharing of data would lead to invaluable savings/benefits. However, since unrestricted data sharing is a competitive impossibility or requires great trust, better solutions must be found.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 looks at the related work. Section 3 presents different data distribution models. Section 4 presents the algorithm and analyzes the security and efficiency of the scheme. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses future work.
RELATED WORK
Secure Multiparty Computation looks at the problem of securely computing a function over distributed inputs. The setting of SMC encompasses tasks as simple as coin-tossing and broadcast, and as complex as electronic voting, electronic auctions, electronic cash schemes, contract signing, anonymous transactions, and private information retrieval schemes. The key idea behind Secure Multi-party Computation is that a computation is secure if at the end of the computation, no party learns anything except its own input and the results (and anything that can be inferred from these two pieces). The gold standard is that of a trusted third party which performs the entire computation. Thus, the key is to achieve the same results without having a trusted third party.
Secure computation has a very rich history. Yao first postulated the two-party comparison problem (Yao's Millionaire Protocol) and developed a provably secure solution [20] . Goldreich et al. [9] generalized this to multi-party computation and proved that there exists a secure solution for any functionality. The approach used is as follows: the function F to be computed is first represented as a combinatorial circuit, and then the parties run a short protocol for every gate in the circuit. Every participant gets random shares of the input and output wires for every gate. This approach, though appealing in its generality and simplicity, means that the number of rounds of the protocol grow with the size of the circuit. This grows with the size of the input. This is highly inefficient for large inputs or complicated circuits, as in optimization. Although this proves secure solutions exist, achieving efficient secure solutions for distributed optimization is still open.
There is work in distributed optimization that aims to achieve a global objective using only local information. This falls in the general area of distributed decision making with incomplete information. This line of research that has been investigated in a worst case setting (with no communication between the distributed agents) by Papadimitriou et al. [14] , who prove lower bounds on the optimaity of distributed algorithms having no communication. Distributed Constraint Satisfaction was formalized by Yokoo [21] to solve naturally distributed constraint satisfaction problems. These problems are divided between agents, who then have to communicate among themselves to solve them. To address distributed optimization, complete algorithms like OptAPO and ADOPT have been recently introduced.
In general, the work in distributed optimization has concentrated on reducing communication costs and has paid little or no attention to security constraints. Thus, some of the summaries may reveal significant information. In particular, the rigor of security proofs has not been applied much in this area. There is some work in secure optimization. Silaghi and Rajeshirke [17] show that a secure combinatorial problem solver must necessarily pick the result randomly among optimal solutions to be really secure. Silaghi and Mitra [16] propose arithmetic circuits for solving constraint optimization problems that are exponential in the number of variables for any constraint graph. A significantly more efficient optimization protocol specialized on generalized Vickrey auctions and based on dynamic programming is proposed by Suzuki and Yokoo [18] , though it is not completely secure under the framework in [17] . Yokoo et al. [22] also propose a scheme using public key encryption for secure distributed constraint satisfaction. Silaghi et al. [15] show how to construct an arithmetic circuit with the complexity properties of DFS-based variable elimination, and that finds a random optimal solution for any constraint optimization problem. However, much of this work is still based on generic solutions and not quite ready for practical use.
Li and Atallah [10] have proposed a more efficient solution for this problem based on adapting the simplex method to make it secure. As such, the computation and communication complexity of their solution is proportional to that of the simplex method, which could be exponential in the worst case. Also their solution uses expensive subprotocols which make it quite computationally challenging for large problems. Our solution is much more efficient and practical. Du [4] has also studied this problem, and proposed a similar transformation based solution. Indeed, our work is inspired by his work -however, his solution does not work correctly in all cases, and little analysis of security and efficiency is provided. Our solution looks at a specific data partitioning scenario, is more robust, and is analyzed in signficantly more depth.
MODEL
Optimization is the study of problems in which one seeks to minimize or maximize a real function by systematically choosing the values of real or integer variables from within an allowed set. Formally, given a function f : A −→ R from some set A to the real numbers, we seek an element
, ∀x ∈ A ("maximization"). Thus, an optimization problem has three basic ingredients:
• An objective function which we want to minimize or maximize.
• A set of unknowns or variables which affect the value of the objective function.
• A set of constraints that allow the unknowns to take on certain values or exclude others.
In linear programming, the objective fuction f is linear and the set A is specified using only linear equalities and inequalities. Thus, for linear programming, the problem can be easily restated as
Optimization problems (especially issues in linear programming) have been well studied in the literature -methods have been proposed for the case when all of the data is available at a central site. Methods have also been proposed for the case with incomplete information (distributed optimization). However all solution methods assume that all the necessary data is centralized or freely available. Privacy/security causes a problem whenever the data is distributed. There are many ways in which data could be distributed. Each of the ingredients of the optimization problem could be distributed. For example, the objective function might be known to only one party, or parts of it known to some subsets of the parties. The constraints that define the set A might also be distributed in some fashion. Different parties might own different constraints or even different parts of the same constraint. Thus, the different ways in which data is distributed give rise to the following categorization.
Horizontal Partitioning / Homogeneous Distribution: Here, each constraint would be fully owned by one party. Thus, different parties own different constraints. An example of this would be the distributed scheduling problem. Suppose that several schedulers need to schedule tasks on machines. Each task can be executed by several machines (though not all), and it can be split between several machines, but the fraction of all tasks executed by a machine must under no circumstances exceed its capacity. Each scheduler only knows the tasks that may be executed on its pertinent machines, and based on this information it must decide what fractions of its task to send to which machines. The sum of all fractions is to be maximized. Here, the objective function could be known to a single party or to all of the parties, or even be shared by the parties.
Vertical Partitioning / Heterogeneous Distribution: In this case, each constraint is shared between some subset of the parties. An example of this would be the organization theory problem. A large enterprise has a very extensive set of tasks -say, products manufactured. A fundamental question in Organization Theory is, how are these tasks to be partitioned among managers? Although the profitability and resource requirements of these products may change dynamically with market conditions, the constraint structure, the sparsity pattern of the constraint matrix of the associated linear program, may be fixed. That is, it is known in advance, which products compete for which resources. What are the organizational principles that should guide this assignment of tasks to managers, so that the latter can make more informed decisions. Again, the objective function might be known to all of the parties, or just to a single party, or be shared by the parties.
Arbitrary Partitioning: Apart from the prior two partitioning methods, the data may also be arbitrary partitioned in some way (some combination of the above). This is more general and subsumes both of the earlier cases. Completely arbitrary partitioning of data is unlikely in practice, though certain specific configurations might easily be found. In any case, solutions for this case will always work for both of the prior cases as well.
The specific problem we look at in this paper consists of a special case of arbitrary partitioning, where one party owns the objective function while the other party owns the constraints. This may happen, for example, in the case of a manufacturer that would like to evaluate several transportation options between its factories, raw material suppliers and distribution points. Here, it would know the constraints, while different transporters would have different costs (leading to different objective functions).
ALGORITHM
The effectiveness of any solution can be measured on the basis of three critical properties -privacy/security, utility, and efficiency. Does the solution preserve the privacy/security of the data? How useful is the solution (i.e., how accurate are the analysis results)? How efficient is the solution? Any solution that completely disgregards even one of these properties is not of any use, while the ideal solution would perfectly satisfy all three parameters. However, most current solutions end up meeting one or two of the objectives, while disregarding the third. We now present a transformation based solution to the problem.
A Transformation Approach:. A possible solution is to transform the vector space by applying a linear transformation. This idea was first proposed by Du to solve systems of linear equations [5] . Du later proposed extending this idea to solve the two party linear programming problem [4] . However their solution sketch gives incorrect results in many cases (a non-optimal solution is incorrectly reported as optimal). We now show how a correct solution can be created. As noted before, assume that you want to solve the problem:
The key to the solution is based on the fact that M QQ 
However, this would imply that y is a better solution to the new problem than y * which leads to a contradiction (since y * is supposed to be the optimal solution). Thus, it is clear that transformation will give us the correct solution.
Even assuming that it is possible to secretly compute the transformed matrix, how does this help privacy? That depends on who knows the Q matrix and who solves the modified LP problem. Assume that P 1 knows the cost function and P2 knows the constraints. Figure 1 shows the four possible combinations -based on who knows Q and who solves the new LP problem. Let us consider each of them in turn. In (1), P 1 determines Q and solves the new LP problem. In this case, P 1 knows a n × n invertible matrix and learns the m × n matrix M Q. It is an easy task to post-multiply by Q −1 and thus to retrieve M . This leads to no security for P 2 . Similarly, in (4), P 2 knows Q and solves the new LP problem. In this case, P 2 can compute Q −1 and knowing C T Q, can retrieve C T . In this case, there is no security for P1. That leaves us with (2) and (3). In (2), P1 knows Q, but P 2 solves the modified LP problem. In this case, P 2 gets M Q as well as C T Q. Since M is a m × n matrix it is non-invertible, thus it is not possible to exactly learn Q. However, that does still leave P 2 with m linear equations in n unknowns for each column vector of the Q matrix. The most secure case is (3), where P2 knows Q and P1 solves the problem. In this case, P1 learns M Q as well as C T Q. Knowing C T enables it to learn only one linear equation in each of the column vectors of Q. There is no direct way for it to entirely recreate M in any way. Is this the best possible? Not necessarily. There are two more alternatives.
The first is the possibility of using an untrusted third party. P 1 and P 2 jointly compute/decide on the matrix Q, and use it to create the modified LP problem. They now send this to the third party which actually solves the problem and returns the solution to them. As long as the third party does not collude with either P1 or P2 they are completely secure. We can prove that as far as the third party is concerned, the entire set of constraints and objective could be transformed to an infinite number of systems (essentially there is no way to distinguish the hiding matrix Q from any other matrix Q ). Since there are an infinite number of such matrices, this is the most secure alternative. However, it depends on the existence of an untrusted third party. While this is much easier than finding a completely trusted party, what happens when even an untrusted party cannot be found? In that case, we may have a final technical alternative, which is also the most interesting. P 1 and P 2 jointly create the Q matrix, but each holds a share of it, i.e., Q = Q1 + Q2, with Qi held by Pi. Now they can compute M Q as well as C T Q, and either one can then go ahead and solve the problem. Let us now analyze what happens in either case. If P 2 solves the LP problem. P 2 gets M Q1 + M Q2. It can subtract M Q2 to get M Q1. In this case, P2 knows m linear equations in n unknowns for each of the columns of Q1 which is not sufficient to determine Q1. P 2 will also find out C T (Q1 + Q2). But without knowing Q1, there is no way to determine C T . The other case, where P1 solves the LP problem is better for security. Here P1 gets
, it can learn C T Q2 but this only gives it one equation in n unknowns for each column of Q2, which is quite insufficient to determine the real values. P 1 also learns M Q1 + M Q2 but without knowing Q2 there is no way for it to determine M . Thus, this is the better of the two options.
One might think that splitting the Q matrix gains us significant advantage in terms of security. But this is not quite true. Let us extend our analysis further. If we look at the best cases seen so far, the only difference is that P1 would learn M (Q1 + Q2) where it only knows Q1 as against learning M Q where it knows nothing. It is not clear that this is necessarily any better. In either case as long as n >> m, this gives us a reasonable amount of security. The situation can only be improved with extension to multiple parties as well as arbitrary partitioning. The final detail necessary to show the feasibility of the approach is a method to securely transform a matrix. This is possible using several different ways, including the method proposed by Du [4, 6] based on Oblivious Transfer.
Secure Transformation
At the heart transformation requires matrix multiplication which really boils down to a lot of scalar product com- putations. Thus multiplying a m × n matrix with a n × n matrix simply requires mn scalar products. Goethals et al [8] propose a simple and provably secure method to compute the scalar product using Homomorphic Encryption. We now briefly describe it. The problem is defined as follows: P 1 has a n-dimensional vector X while P 2 has a ndimensional vector Y . At the end of the protocol, P1 should get ra = X · Y + r b where r b is a random number chosen from an uniform distribution and is known only to P 2 . The key idea behind the protocol is to use a homomorphic encryption system such as the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [3] , the Benaloh cryptosystem [2] , the NaccacheStern cryptosystem [11] , the Paillier cryptosystem [13] , and the Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem [12] . Homomorphic Encryption is a semantically-secure public-key encryption which, in addition to standard guarantees has the additional property that given any
two encryptions E(A) and E(B), there exists an encryption E(A * B) such that E(A) * E(B) = E(A * B)
, where * is either addition or multiplication (in some abelian group). The cryptosystems mentioned above are additively homomorphic (thus the operation * denotes addition). Using such a system, it is quite simple to create a scalar product protocol. The key is to note that
. If P 1 encrypts her vector and sends in encrypted form to P 2 , P 2 can using the additive homomorphic property to compute the dot product. The specific details are given below: Require: P1 has input vector X = {x1, . . . , xn} Require: P 2 has input vector Y = {y 1 , . . . , y n } Require: P 1 and P 2 get outputs r A , r B respectively such that rA + rB = X · Y 1: P1 generates a private and public key pair (sk, pk). 2: P 1 sends pk to P 2 . 3: for i = 1 . . . n do 4: P 1 generates a random new string r i .
5:
P1 sends to P2 ci = Enc pk (xi; ri). 6: end for 7: P 2 computes w = Q n i=1 c y i i 8: P 2 generates a random plaintext r B and a random nonce r. 9: P1 sends to P2 w = w · Enc pk (−rB; r ). 10:
It is quite easy to extend this to work for matrix multiplication and for shared matrices. According to the distributive law of matrix algebra, M (Q1 + Q2) = M Q1 + M Q2. P2 first computes the encrypted form of M Q2 and sends this to P1 along with the encrypted form of M . Using the properties of homomorphic encryption, P 1 can now compute M Q1 in encrypted form, and then compute the encrypted form of M Q1 + M Q2. P 1 then sends this back to P 2 who decrypts to finally get M Q. The detailed algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
The computation and communication cost of this algorithm is quite reasonable. A total of 2mn encryptions are necessary. n exponentiations and n multiplications are necessary for one scalar product. Another multiplication is re-Algorithm 1 Transformation algorithm Require: P 1 has the n × n matrix Q1 Require: P 2 has the n × n matrix Q2 and the m × n matrix M 1: P2 generates a private and public key pair (sk, pk). 2: P 2 sends pk to P 1 . 3: P 2 computes the m × n matrix R = M Q2 4: P 2 computes R = Enc pk (R) (i.e., the encryption of each element of R with pk -a random nonce is chosen for each encryption) 5: P 2 computes M = Enc pk (M ) (i.e., the encryption of each element of M with pk -again, a random nonce is chosen for each encryption) 6: P2 sends M and R to P1 7: {P1 now computes the encrypted matrix S as follows} 8: for each row i of M and each column j of Q1 do 9: 1.875min 13min m = 30, n = 100 7.5min 52min Table 2 : Computation cost of transformation quired to add the corresponding R component. A total of mn scalar products are required. Thus a total of mn 2 exponentiations and mn 2 + mn multiplications are required. Finally, mn decryptions are required to obtain the transformed matrix. The cost of the exponentiations dominates all of the other costs. One exponentiation requires 0.0015s for 512 bit encryption and 0.0104s for 1024 bit encryption on an Intel Pentium Dual 830, 3.00 GHZ with 2 GB ram. Table 2 gives the estimated approximate cost for several different values of m and n. If a single Q matrix known to P 2 is used, the process is much simpler. Now, P1 only has to learn C T Q, while P2 will send it M Q. The process almost exactly as above, except that m = 1. Therefore, the total computation cost is on the order of n 2 exponentiations, thus being significantly cheaper.
The above discussion shows the feasibility of transformation for two parties with the specific data distribution. However, in general, several questions still need to be resolved. One issue is the fact that the elements of the C and M matrices could be real, where as the secure transformation procedure will only operate on integers in a finite field (since Homomorphic Encryption operates over a closed field of integers). This can lead to several problems. However, assuming a large enough field, and a fixed precision for all of the real numbers, we can convert them into integers without losing too much precision. Also, since none of the operations involve division, we do not need to worry about truncation or rounding off errors. In extremely rare cases, if the amount of precision is insufficient, the final solution might be different -this depends on how sensitive the system is to change in the constraints, but with enough precision this is highly unlikely. One may also carry out sensitivity analysis [7] on the solution and recompute at higher precision if necessary.
Another issue is that of repeated use of the algorithms with almost the same dataset. While there is no impact by simply rerunning the scalar product protcol, there can be a difference in the sense of the overall protocol. Essentially, if a different matrix Q is used while recomputing the same lp between the same two parties (perhaps since the objective function changes), this may leak too much information, since more linear equations are revealed. If a completely untrusted party is used to do the actual solution computation, this does not impact security. However, if, as described earlier, one of the parties is carrying out the computation, the effect of having extra equations must be considered before engaging in the protocol.
Finally, the case may also exist that there are more constraints than variables. This clearly causes a security problem since simple transformation of the space still gives more equations than variables. For a secure solution, one possibility may be to solve the dual problem [7] instead of the primal problem -this will reduce the number of constraints below the number of variables. However, the objective function and the right hand side of the constraints are interchanged, having other security implications. We will further explore this issue in the future.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents the privacy-preserving linear programming problem and presents and motivates several different data distributions possible in real situations. We present a practical transformation based solution that can solve the special two party case where one party owns the objective while the other owns the constraints. However, several questions remain for the future. First, the security implied by the solution is still somewhat heuristic. While the security of the method can be easily discussed, the question of what can be learned from the transformation itself is still unknown. For example, does knowing the transformed constraints reveal any useful information? While it is clear that the original constraints cannot be reconstituted from the transformed ones, what about other features. Can you infer anything about the hardness of the problem, or the type of constraints, or their relation to each other? All of these are significant questions that need to be looked at in more detail for practical deployment of the solution. Some of the work in secure computation shows possible solutions approaches. If we could show that the results of any function computed from the constraints in polynomial time are indistinguishable from random numbers uniformly generated, we can prove that transformation leaks nothing. This needs to be further explored. It should also be possible to easily extend the transformation based solution to arbitrary partitioning of data. Extending it to multiple parties is more challenging, but is important for practical deployment. Another observation is that it should be possible to adapt the transformation approach to work for integer programming as well as quadratic programming. For integer programming the case is exactly the case as for linear programming. For quadratic programming, the form of the constraints changes -therefore the transformation method must take this into account. However, polynomial evaluation may be used to still perform the transformation. We intend to further ex-plore all of these problems in the future.
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